

Joint Cabinet Crisis

العربيّ مصر جمهوريّة

Egyptian Council of Ministers

BACKGROUND GUIDE

TechMUN 2006



March 24-25, 2006

**Thomas Jefferson High School for Science and Technology
Alexandria, Virginia**

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Ben Field - *Secretary-General*
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Sophia Mian - *Director-General*

Joint Cabinet Crisis
Egyptian Council of Ministers





TechMUN 2006

March 24-25, 2006



February 23, 2006

Ben Field
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Sachi Edson
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Dear Delegates,

I am Sophia Mian, the Director General for TechMUN 2006, and on behalf of the Secretariat I would like to welcome you all to the conference. Preparations for this conference began a full year ago, and I sincerely hope that the dedication and hard work of our chairs and staff proves this to be the best TechMUN ever!

TechMUN this year brandishes a number of General Assembly Committees, Specialized Agencies, and of course our crown jewel, the Joint Cabinet Crisis. As usual, we will host both middle school and high school delegates, and we are confident that through our variety of committees we will have a little something to please everyone. If at any time during the conference you have questions, concerns, or suggestions, please feel free to address them to your chairs or directly to myself or another member of the Secretariat. While we truly enjoy putting the conference together, this weekend is meant to be about you. So, since we do not have the privilege of participating in committee, if you see a Secretariat badge, we encourage you to stop us to let us know how your TechMUN experience is going and if there is anything we can do to help.

I am a senior this year and have been an active member of Model UN for all four years of high school. As I think towards graduation, I realize how attached I have become to the club in my four short years at TJ. I cannot even begin to imagine the attachment of our sponsor, Mr. McCarthy, who has been with TJ Model UN for the last sixteen years and who is also leaving with the senior class. In honor of this being his last TechMUN, I urge everyone to work your hardest to make this conference especially memorable. Good luck and enjoy your weekend!

Sincerely,

Sophia Mian
Director-General
TechMUN 2006



TechMUN 2006

March 24-25, 2006



February 20, 2006

Ben Field

Secretary-General

Sachi Edson

Undersecretary-General

Sophia Mian

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Dear Delegates,

Hello there! My name is Raamin Mostaghimi, and I'll be your friendly neighborhood Crisis Czar for the TechMUN 2006 Joint Cabinet Crisis (JCC). I'm currently a senior at TJ, and I've been doing MUN for the past three years, so a good portion of you will probably have seen me around at locals and nationals. I had the privilege of being the Deputy Crisis Czar last year, and a crisis staffer the year before, so hopefully this experience will go smoothly.

To that end, my Deputy Czar Robert Posacki and I will be working diligently to provide you all with the best possible experience for the two days that you'll be in our care. All of us have put a whole lot of effort into this over the course of almost six months, so come prepared for anything. Remember to stay professional, keep the consequences of your actions in mind, use available resources and information, but most of all, have a good time. If you've got any questions at all, feel free to contact me or my deputy. See you soon!

Sincerely,

Raamin Mostaghimi
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TechMUN 2006

March 24-25, 2006



February 28, 2006

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Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the Cabinet of the Egyptian Arab Republic at TechMUN 2006! My name is Manvi Goel, and I am looking forward to presiding over this crisis committee.

I am a senior at Thomas Jefferson High School and have been involved with the Model United Nations Club since my freshman year. Probably the best thing I've taken away from participating in Model UN, apart from a deeply-rooted interest in international affairs and a somewhat fearless attitude towards speaking, are the remarkable friends I've made. While simultaneously spending an enormous amount of time preparing and planning for conferences, I have had the pleasure of hanging out with some of the most exciting people I know. There is nothing like a 15 minute pit stop for coffee at Starbucks before a conference, or a movie/dinner after the last Saturday session. When I am not doing MUN, I may be spending my weekends at Lincoln Douglas Debate tournaments or Future Problem Solving Competitions. In the past, I have been involved with the Jefferson Crew Team as well as the French Honor Society. This is my fourth and last year staffing/chairing at TechMUN, and I am certain that this experience will be the best.

I will be joined at TechMUN by my co-chair, Janet Kim, who is an alumna of TJ Model UN now at Stanford University.

If anyone has questions regarding the Egyptian Cabinet topics and the crisis simulation, or if you just want to drop me a line, you can contact me via email. Have fun and good luck with your preparations!

Sincerely,

Manvi Goel
Chair, Egyptian Cabinet
mg_idealistic07@hotmail.com

Egyptian Council of Ministers Committee Format and Expectations

Committee Expectations and Position Papers

To make the most of this crisis simulation, it will be important for you to understand the role and workings of this cabinet as well as your obligations as Ministers. For important information, please read the Cabinet introduction below.

Committee Format. The way the TechMUN crisis simulation will run is unique in the sense that it will incorporate two Egyptian political bodies: the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Cabinet. Each of the two groups has a long history in Egyptian politics; understanding the motivations behind the radical Muslim Brotherhood and its relationship with the secularist Egyptian Cabinet will be essential in working with members within and across cabinets. As members of the Egyptian Cabinet, you represent the loyalists of the National Democratic Party and the leader of the party, President Mubarak. The Background Guide that follows is written to give you information on the foundations of the Egyptian Cabinet as well as several current issues – party leadership/Egyptian democratic reform and Islamic militancy in the Middle East – that influence the cabinet’s decision making or conflict with the proper functioning of the executive body.

Expectations. As Ministers, you should come prepared with a brief memo written to the Prime Minister, preferably two pages double-spaced, explaining your views and giving possible solutions concerning the cabinet topics. Your opinions or conclusions should reflect the cabinet position that you are representing. In addition to reading the background guide, I recommend exploring additional sources to expand your knowledge on the topics. Some good sources to consider are international news organizations such as BBC.com and Wordpress.org or the website of the Egyptian Presidency.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CABINET OF THE EGYPTIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

The Role of the Cabinet

The Cabinet Ministers and the Prime Minister compose the chief executive body of the Egyptian Arab Republic. The head of the executive branch is the President, whose powers stem from his ability to appoint Prime Ministers, Cabinet members, and one or more Vice Presidents. The Cabinet's primary influence is towards the Parliament, or the People's Assembly, to whom it may propose laws, call for amendments, and enact procedures that speed up Parliamentary debate. The People's Assembly has several reciprocal powers, such as the ability to force the resignation of the Cabinet or call for Inquiries to the Government (*Talebat Ihata*), which are a set of questions from the Parliament that the chief executive body is required to answer.

While the president holds the greatest authority in making decisions regarding foreign affairs and defense, he relies heavily on his Cabinet Ministers to enact domestic and economic policies. The Cabinet works in the best interest of the State; it has the responsibility of drafting the general budget of the State, preparing the general policy of the State in collaboration with the President, maintaining State security, and protecting the rights of Egyptian citizens.

Ministerial Responsibilities

It will be the responsibility of each cabinet minister to present priorities from the perspective of his area of expertise and to give expert advice relevant to his background in any crisis that arises. Having a strong understanding of the role and function of your department is critical. Delegates should also develop individual strategies for utilizing the particular strengths of their posts to affect the options and policies of other cabinets, overtly and covertly. Each minister has the opportunity to look at any situation from a unique perspective; having a thorough understanding of one's individual position will be important in advising the Prime Minister and the President.

Your particular views with respect to the topics for this cabinet should be summarized in the **brief 2 page memo to the Prime Minister**.

TOPIC 1: PARTY LEADERSHIP AND EGYPTIAN DEMOCRATIC REFORM

Statement of the Issue

While Egypt is recognized as a republic by name, it has been proven historically and through recent events to be far from true democratic governance. The Egyptian presidency and the election of the chief executive are the areas of most concern. The National Democratic Party's overwhelming power and influence in government is unmatched by any other political faction. For almost 27 years, the NDP has not only held the majority in the People's Assembly, but has been the sole provider for a presidential candidate. Currently, Egypt is trying to emulate the western system of free, multi-candidate elections, but little progress has been made. The president continues to lead and support the NDP; competing parties have little or no authority in elections. The establishment of a true democracy in Egypt is a sensitive issue that is affecting the entire global community.

History

Egypt began limited self-rule in 1922 when it was granted independence from British colonial rule. At the time, several political factions had arisen, such as the

nationalist Wafd Party, the communist party, and the Muslim Brotherhood, each competing to gain power over the free nation. The British, determined to retain control over the Suez Canal, installed King Faud as the leader despite opposition from emerging parties. King Faud, throughout his rule, served the interest of both Egypt and Britain. King Faruq continued absolute rule after King Faud's death in 1936. Eventually, in 1952, a revolutionary group of World War II army officers known as the "free officers," led by Lt. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, overthrew King Faruq's government, establishing a republic in Egypt. Nasser's government abolished previous British influence, renewed Egyptian culture, and promoted socialism. Although he ruled as an autocrat, he earned a great deal of popular respect and support.

Vice President Anwar el-Sadat, also a "free officer," took over the presidency after Nasser's death. Putting an end to Nasser's socialist policies, Sadat pushed economic liberalization and political freedom. In 1978, Sadat established the National Democratic Party, whose primary aim was to embrace the Egyptian national identity, secure proper adherence to the rule of law, and protect individual rights. By establishing the NDP, Sadat led Egypt in its first step towards democratization. The NDP maintained majority status in the People's Assembly throughout Sadat's rule.

When Anwar Sadat was assassinated on October 6, 1981 by

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Topic One: Party Leadership and Egyptian Democratic Reform

Islamic extremists who wanted to retaliate against the President's promotion of the Camp David Accords, the same pattern of single-candidate presidential elections continued. Vice President Hosni Mubarak immediately succeeded Sadat as president and leader of the NDP. Mubarak was later confirmed by popular referendum for three more 6 year terms. As the sole candidate running for president for almost twenty years, Mubarak maintained immense control over Egypt. In 1991, the President initiated an aggressive economic reform movement to increase the role of the private sector but showed no concern for political change. Mubarak was elected for the fourth time in the 1999 referendum with almost 94 percent of the vote; the turnout for the referendum, however, was only 10 percent of the total voting population.

Mubarak even maintained power in Parliament. The majority in the People's Assembly was consistently held by the NDP because of Mubarak's authoritarian rule. In fact, in 2000, 388 representatives in the 454-seat Assembly were affiliated with the ruling National Democratic Party.

Recent Developments

It was not until February 2005 that President Mubarak made his first effort towards democratic reform. The President proposed an amendment to article 76 of the Constitution, allowing multi-candidate elections for the first time. A referendum in May of 2005 was held, and the amendment was

approved by majority of over 82 percent.

The September 7, 2005 Egyptian presidential election was the first contested presidential election in Egypt's history. Under the election law, ten candidates out of a total of 30 were chosen based on guidelines and qualifications set forth by the Presidential Election Commission. The three leading candidates were Hosni Mubarak of the National Democratic Party, Numan Gumaa of the New Wafd Party, and Ayman Nour of the Tomorrow Party. Because the Egyptian Constitution does not recognize political parties following a religious agenda, Egypt's largest Islamic group, the Muslim Brotherhood, was not permitted to nominate a candidate. According to the results, Mubarak won the election with 88.6 percent of the votes. Nour, of the Tomorrow Party, won 7.3 percent of the votes; Gomaa, of the New Wafd Party, won 2.8 percent.

For the last three years, the NDP has been trying to project a modern, reformist image. Egypt's attempt at broadening the base of political participation with new election policies has largely impressed the international community, especially the United States. Many Egyptians, however, feel that the new election was marred by irregularities and scaled to meet the demands of the National Democratic Party. News media in Egypt reported that the NDP transported voters to the polls by bus and then allegedly required the voters to make their

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Topic One: Party Leadership and Egyptian Democratic Reform

choices in front of officials, rather than behind a curtain, an essential requirement of a secret ballot. The Egyptian Organization of Human Rights has charged Mubarak for widespread vote-buying and for the use of improper ink. Polling stations in Cairo were also thought to have been decorated with Mubarak posters; members of the NDP hovered over voters and transported their ballots to polling station officials. Due to the suspected irregularities in the polling process, the international community has also become skeptical of Mubarak's election reform policies.

In July, before the election, Mubarak reshuffled his cabinet, bringing in a strongly economically reformist group. Gamal Mubarak, son of the President and head of the NDP's policy committee, is believed to be close to the new members. With Gamal's increased presence in the NDP's affairs, many Egyptians believe his status as the president's son is putting him in a unique position. There is suspicion that the NDP may be planning for Gamal's succession to his father's post.

Analysis

The challenge now facing the National Democratic Party is to become more transparent in its efforts for democratic reform. Mubarak must show to the nation of Egypt that he genuinely believes in his new referendum policy. For many, his new amendment has been interpreted merely as an attempt to deflect

international pressure without a corresponding commitment to real reform.

While Mubarak's amendment should be recognized as a major step towards Egyptian democratic reform, the specific terms it outlines still make it difficult for multiple parties to participate freely and effectively in elections. One limitation is that individuals aspiring to become candidates must seek the support of 250 elected officials, many of whom are loyal to the NDP. Based on such a condition, the leftist Tagammu Part and the Nasserist Party boycotted the 2005 Presidential Election, arguing that election laws unfairly favored the NDP.

Election turnouts remained low in the last election; in some places turnout was as low as 19 percent. The NDP has been accused of transporting voters to the polls, using non-permanent ink on ballots, and taking over election monitoring. No international monitors were allowed to oversee the recent presidential election. Although Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal applauded the elections and Mubarak for his democratic intentions, United States State Department spokesman Sean McCormack criticized the NDP's late decision to allow international monitors, as well as the lack of media access that prevented opposition parties from getting their message out. Other western nations have extended their views that the shift to

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fairness and democracy in Egypt will be slow and rough.

A great deal of corruption and zeal for power remains within the NDP. The NDP must, in the future, show its willingness and cooperation towards working with other Egyptian parties in bringing about democratic reform.

Conclusions

The goal of this Cabinet should be to regard democratic reform both objectively and subjectively. As current ministers of the Cabinet, it will be important for you to consider both the interests of your party (the National Democratic Party) and Egypt's image to the international community. Egypt must seek drastic changes in establishing itself as a true democracy if it desires economic development and trade partnerships with Western nations.

Furthermore, it will be equally important to uphold Egypt's reputation as a leader among the Arab nations. Ministers should keep in mind that too much western influence in governmental reform may get in the way of Egypt's social and cultural identity.

On the other side of the coin, though, you are ultimately supporters of President Mubarak and the NDP. Thus, it is also your job to work in the best interest of the Party. Upholding NDP dominance in state affairs while providing for increased political

participation will continue to be one of your key objectives.

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Topic 2: Combating Terrorism and Islamic Militancy in the Middle East

Statement of the Issue

One of the main hindrances towards establishing peace in the Middle East has been the emergence of radical Islamic groups in recent decades. While Egypt stands out as a leader among the Arab States in its promotion of peace negotiations with the state of Israel, it has also been charged with harboring key terrorist leaders involved with both domestic violence and international assaults, including the September 11th attacks led by al-Qaeda.

Key affiliates of the *Gamaat Islamiya* and Egyptian Jihad organizations, both Egyptian-based terrorist groups, have been credited with assassination attempts on both the prime minister and President Mubarak. Although Mubarak and previous presidents have tried to weaken the influence of such organizations, Egyptian-based terrorist organizations have been able to expand their networks across borders.

History

The emergence of radical Islamic politics in Egypt has been historically linked to two themes: the Muslim Brotherhood and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Muslim Brotherhood

The radical *jamā'at al-ikhwān al-muslimīn*, translated as the "Society of the Muslim Brothers" or simply the "Muslim Brotherhood" was founded in March 1928. As the only major religiously affiliated political party in Egypt at the time, it opposed secularization and called for a return to original Islamic law. Modeled after the Freemasons secret society, the organization saw itself as an underground political and social revolutionary movement determined to convert Egypt into an Islamic State, free from foreign influence. By 1948, the Brotherhood had acquired up to half a million members and had built a military wing known as the "Specialists." With connections in the Egyptian army and law enforcement branch, the Muslim Brotherhood had the power to strategically plan and carry out political assassinations.

Since 1954, the start of Nasser's rule, the Brotherhood has been an illegal organization, banned by the Constitution, which denounces any political party with religious ties. Ruthlessly

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Topic Two: Combating Terrorism and Islamic Militancy

suppressed by Nasser's secular-nationalist regime in the 1960s, the Muslim Brotherhood became dangerously radical. After an attempt to assassinate the president, the organization faced bitter resentment from the Egyptian public. Although the attempt itself had failed, Nasser jailed many of the militant Brotherhood members and condemned Hassan Al-Banna, the founder of the party, to be hanged. In taking such a hard-line approach, Nasser was able to momentarily erase Islamic extremist ideologies.

By the start of the 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood abolished all of its military ties and established itself as a non-violent, reformist party committed to embracing Islam. At the same time, President Sadat began to loosely acknowledge the party and even released members of the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt's prisons. This action, at least in part, precipitated a renewal of Islamic fundamentalism, which had previously preached revolution.

In 1974, a group of army cadets, organizing themselves as the Islamic Liberation Party, staged an abortive coup. The failure of the coup led to the emergence of two main forces in radical Islamic politics, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the *Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya* (also known as the *Gamaat*

Islamiya). In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood became simply a moderate political body, which sought to apply *Sharia* law through legislative and community-level action. *Gamaat Islamiya* and the Egyptian Jihad grew in number by recruiting university students and poor, less educated Egyptians to fill various posts. Currently, the United States classifies the two militant bodies as terrorist organizations; the *Gamaat Islamiya's* ties to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda have made it a hated group throughout the international community.

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Egypt's most well-known attempt at securing peace in the Middle East was the signing of the Camp David Peace Accords with Israel in 1978. Sadat's groundbreaking trip to Israel and the formation of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, which followed the Accords, represented a fundamental shift in the politics of the region. Although Egypt's new foreign policy initiative satisfied the international community, the Egyptian government faced bitterness from both the Arab League and Islamic extremist groups back home. In 1981, as a reaction to the Accords, the *Gamaat Islamiya* staged a successful assassination of President Sadat. Four of the five militants involved with the

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assassination attempt were immediately hanged.

The conflict between Palestine and Israel began inciting Islamic radicals in Egypt long before Sadat's term. After the Palestinian revolt in 1936, the Muslim Brotherhood began supplying Palestinian Islamic leaders with weapons to defend themselves from Zionist militias. The Brotherhood later organized mass protests in Cairo to rouse Egyptian public opinion against the organization of a Jewish state. The continuous loss of Arab territories to Israel up to 1967, which exacerbated the Palestinian refugee problem, further radicalized Islamic fundamentalists in Egypt. Frustrated by the peace negotiations with Israel, the *Gamaat Islamiya* and the Jihad continued their bitter attacks on Egypt's secular government throughout the 1980s by waging domestic threats on transportation and the tourism industry.

President Mubarak and Reform

It was not until 1990 that President Hosni Mubarak waged a bitter campaign of state violence, mass arrests, and financial crackdowns against the *Gamaat Islamiya* and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The two organizations made several attempts within the decade to retaliate. In June 1995, the organizations attempted to

assassinate Mubarak on his trip to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Later that year, the *Gamaat Islamiya* released a car bomb on the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. The *Gamaat Islamiya's* aim was to destroy Mubarak's government by first destroying the Egyptian economy. In order to do so, the organization repeatedly attacked Egypt's rich tourism industry. In April 1996, shootings at the Europa Hotel in Cairo killed 18 Greek tourists. Perhaps among the most notorious of *Gamaat Islamiya's* tourist assaults was the Luxor massacre in November of 1997, in which approximately 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians were killed. The 1998 bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania have been linked back to the Islamic Jihad, the more internationally linked of the two organizations.

Mubarak's crackdown proved to be useful when the *Gamaat Islamiya*, after its last Egyptian attack in 1998, issued a ceasefire with the Egyptian government in March 1999.

Recent Developments

During the last five years, Egypt has faced a great deal of criticism from the United States and other Western nations for harboring terrorists linked to the Al-Qaeda network. The main deputies of Osama bin Laden, such

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Topic Two: Combating Terrorism and Islamic Militancy

as Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, leader of Egypt's militant Jihad group, have been branded as the brains behind Al-Qaeda's operations. Currently, seven of 22 people on the US Federal Bureau of Investigation's "most wanted" terrorist list are Egyptian. Sheikh Omar Abd al-Rahman, another close affiliate of the *Gamaat Islamiya*, was arrested in connection with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and is currently imprisoned in the United States. An unprecedented 243 Egyptian militants have been referred to Egyptian military courts; two-thirds of them are said to be from *Gamaat al-Islamiya*, suggesting that the state has abandoned the initial leniency showed in response to the group's ceasefire call in 1999.

Mubarak, in an effort to resume steps towards peace in the Middle East and to bolster friendly relations with the United States, hosted two summits in 2000 at Sharm El-Sheikh and Taba in order to recommence the Camp David negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian leadership that had been suspended earlier. More recently, in 2005, another summit was organized in Sharm El-Sheikh to continue peace talks; Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Jordan were all present. The Egyptian Chief of Intelligence, General Omar Suleiman, was commended by both the Israelis

and the Palestinians for his substantial role in the negotiations.

Tragically, however, the same resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh, which hosts many foreign tourists throughout the year, faced three nearly simultaneous bombings in July of 2005, killing 88 and wounding 200. This recent assault was the deadliest terrorist attack in Egypt since 1981.

Analysis

Perhaps the rise of Islamic militancy in Egypt can be linked to the nation's problems with democratization. Egypt's lack of opportunities for political participation may have helped promote extremism. The Muslim Brotherhood, which was from its birth never acknowledged as a legal political party, sought violence as a means of promoting its cause when it was alienated from political discourse.

The inconsistencies within the Egyptian government themselves may have sparked Islamic militancy. The republican regime that came into power in 1952 made some critical errors in balancing the demands of radical Islamic groups. Former Egyptian President Gamal Nasser's crackdown was almost too brutal towards the rising religious political party, the Muslim Brotherhood. Anwar Sadat, Nasser's successor,

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Topic Two: Combating Terrorism and Islamic Militancy

conversely tacitly encouraged the growth of the Brotherhood, granting it freedoms and incorporating the party within the state. President Mubarak, who came in to power after the emergence of *Gamaat Islamiya* and the Egyptian Jihad, used a mixture of Nasser's hard-line tactics and Sadat's accommodating tactics. The lack of a consistent policy agenda in dealing with Islamic radicalism and regional security has in fact hindered the establishment of peace.

Conclusions

As Ministers of the Cabinet of the Egyptian Arab Republic, your primary objective is to secure the safety of the Egyptian people. You must make sure that the state does not become vulnerable to the demands and threats of terrorist networks.

The extent to which radical Islamic organizations are given freedom must be carefully evaluated. Egyptian politicians have consistently rejected charges that link the government as a conspirator with the *Gamaat Islamiya* or the Egyptian Jihad. The Egyptian leadership has consistently projected a strong defiance towards such organizations.

Keep in mind that the Cabinet's policies reflect the

stipulations of the Constitution. While the Muslim Brotherhood has a long history in Egyptian politics, it is against Constitutional precepts to recognize such an organization as a legal political party.

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