

The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe and to Islam

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ABSTRACT *This article highlights aspects of Islamism ignored in much conventional political science by applying to it a composite conceptual framework made up of Hannah Arendt's concept of totalitarianism as an ideology, movement and system of rule; political religion conceptualised both as a cultural system and as an ideology; the growing 'cultur-ation' and 'religionisation' of politics; and the politicisation of Islam. When applied to Islamism this approach highlights the fact that its use of terrorism is one aspect of a much broader reaction to the threat of Islam society's radical secularisation under the impact of the universalisation of western values. At its core lies an imagined umma community – postulated as an alternative model of civilisation to one offered by 'the West' – that claims global hegemony for its values. The analysis stresses that Islamism is not to be equated with Islam, or treated as a monolith, but rather as a religiously and culturally diversified phenomenon whose common denominator is adherence to *din-wa-daula*, i.e. the unity of Islamic religious principles as the legitimisation of a totalitarian government. As a transnational force waging an irregular war fuelled by a fundamentalist interpretation of religion, it is resistant to attack by conventional military or security measures.*

In contemporary Islamism – to be distinguished from Islam – one finds two features united: a totalitarian movement combined with a political religion. It is unfortunate that only few people understand the phenomenon well. Why? It is the preoccupation with 'terrorism'¹ that has been prevalent since 9/11. One observes a mushrooming of unbalanced literature, whose authors mostly turn a blind eye to the roots of this phenomenon. Some ignore the need to investigate the historical factors that breed political violence, whereas those who do acknowledge the root causes often do little more than confirm the stereotype that world poverty and globalisation are the underlying causes of terrorism. Further, many of these authors leave us in the dark about the phenomenon and its social and ideological dynamics. One of the few intelligent pieces published in the western press was a commentary in the *International Herald Tribune*, published after the death of the Jordanian jihadist leader Musab al-Zarqawi, which acknowledged: 'The most important lesson of his reign of terror was the mirror it held up to our misunderstandings of the jihadist threat'.² As the authors of this commentary went on to note, the least understood issue is the fact that 'the jihadists comprise a social movement, not just a cluster of terrorist organisations'.

This article sets out to expand on and substantiate this insight by presenting Islamism as a transnational movement that is based on a political religion. As such, it represents the most recent variant of totalitarianism. Its strength lies in its ability to draw on an ideology rooted not only in a real religious faith but also that has assumed an intensely politicised expression. This process is referred to here with the term the ‘religionisation of politics’, a neologism that, though hardly melifluous, is needed to distinguish political religions that emanate from the politicisation of religion from those which are sacralised forms of secular politics, such as fascism or communism. The religionisation of politics by jihadists, their extensive use of religious formulae and terms to articulate a political agenda, and their presentation of this strategy as a divine mission, result from the politicisation of Islam into Islamism.³

I. Introduction: the Hypothesis

When reading the majority of texts that comprise the vast literature that has been published by self-proclaimed pundits on political Islam, it is easy to miss the fact that a new movement has arisen. Further, this literature fails to explain in a satisfactory manner the fact that the ideology which drives it is based on a particular interpretation of Islam, and that it is thus a politicised religious faith, not a secular one. The only book in which political Islam is addressed as a form of totalitarianism is the one by Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (2003). The author is, however, not an expert, cannot read Islamic sources, and therefore relies on the selective use of one or two secondary sources, thus failing to grasp the phenomenon. One of the reasons for such shortcomings is the fact that most of those who seek to inform us about the ‘jihadist threat’ – and Berman is typical of this scholarship – not only lack the language skills to read the sources produced by the ideologues of political Islam, but also lack knowledge about the cultural dimension of the movement. This new totalitarian movement is in many ways a novelty in the history of politics since it has its roots in two parallel and related phenomena: first, the culturalisation of politics which leads to politics being conceptualised as a cultural system (a view pioneered by Clifford Geertz); and second the return of the sacred, or ‘re-enchantment’ of the world, as a reaction to its intensive secularisation resulting from globalisation.

The analysis of political ideologies that are based on religions, and that can exert appeal as a political religion as a consequence of this, involves a social science understanding of the role of religion played by world politics, especially after the bi-polar system of the Cold War has given way to a multi-polar world. In a project conducted at the Hannah Arendt Institute for the application of totalitarianism to the study of political religions, I proposed the distinction between secular ideologies that act as a substitute for religion, and religious ideologies based on genuine religious faith, which is the case in religious fundamentalism (see note 24). Another project on ‘Political Religion’, carried out at the University of Basel, has made clearer the point that new approaches to politics become necessary once a religious faith becomes clothed in a political garb.⁴

Drawing on the authoritative sources of political Islam, this article suggests that the great variety of organisations inspired by Islamist ideology are to be conceptualised both as political religions and as political movements. The unique quality of political Islam lies in the fact that it is based on a transnational religion (see note 26). The ‘religionisation’ of politics in this case – as a politicisation of the

Islamic religion – represents the return of the importance of the sacred on an international scale. Political Islam presents a civilisational–cultural ‘awakening’ that is framed as a ‘revolt against the West’ (see note 30), a conceptualisation of its mission which makes it necessary to distinguish between Islam as a faith and Islamism as a political ideology. In describing this political ideology as ‘totalitarian’ this article is following the tradition of analysis pioneered by Hannah Arendt, who distinguished between totalitarianism as an ideology, as a movement and as a political rule.⁵ Thus Islamism is discussed here on the levels of movement, political system and ideology. Among the basic features common to all forms of totalitarianism is the goal of imposing norms of belief and behaviour on all aspects of life, thus also denying any separation between the private and the public sphere. As a form of totalitarianism, Islamism plans to subordinate civil society to the comprehensive state apparatus directed by a totalising Shari’ah. It also contains anti-Semitism, one of the components that Arendt identified as a fundamental feature of totalitarian ideologies.⁶

For jihadists, the resort to terror is not an end of itself, rather it is a means employed in the service of what Sayyid Qutb called a ‘world revolution of jihad’,⁷ an idea that aims at establishing an order of *Hakimiyyat Allah* [God’s rule] as the precondition to remaking the world. The new order will first be established within the world of Islam (i.e. ‘the Islamic state’) and then expanded to become a new world system of governance. Given these ambitions, any approach that focuses solely on Islamism as a form of terrorism will fail to grasp its nature both as a totalitarian ideology and as movement that bases itself on a form of political religion. Jihadism is not only a threat to international security, but equally to open society in general, be it in the world of Islam or in the West. Certainly, it is inconceivable that the Islamic world order that it aspires to inaugurate could ever materialise in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the mobilising potential of the new political religion contributes to creating disorder⁸ in the world of Islam, in the Muslim diaspora of Europe and across the globe in general. For all these reasons, it is appropriate to study the many component organisations of the contemporary Islamist movement as a totalitarian, transnational movement based on political religion in the sense we have outlined.

The phenomenon of Islamism combines a totalising movement and the ideology of political religion. The jihadism that adopts terrorism as its most recent military strategy is only one branch of Islamism. This jihadism presents a new pattern for warfare, one that is no longer waged between organised state armies. In this context, Martin van Creveld coined the term ‘low intensity war’, and Kalevi Holsti speaks of a ‘war of the third kind’. Both allude to the way jihadist terrorism follows the pattern of an irregular war fought by non-state actors, members of an organisation that does not respect any internationally agreed rules of engagement or conduct.⁹ If this violence were not based on an ideology articulated in religious–cultural terms, then one would be inclined to view its perpetrators as simple criminals violating the law; and hence to be countered only through strategies of professional policing. This would be wrong because jihadist Islamists are men acting as ‘true believers’ in a totalitarian movement. A closer look at the jihadist organisations that form one component of the Islamist movement shows that they are the product of the twin process of the religionisation of politics and the politicisation of religion. This observation reveals to us how the ideological dynamics of Islamism differ from those of sacralised political ideologies, such as communism or fascism.

In the context of the jihadisation of Islam, such movements adopt the strategies of irregular warfare, and of the 'Shari'ahisation' of Islam that promotes a totalitarian order – both of which can only be rationalised by a selective reading of Islamic tradition and theology – consequently, political religion becomes an essential concomitant of the way jihadism operates as a political movement. Not only does the ideology of contemporary jihadism deviate significantly from the tradition of classical Islamic jihad, but also the traditional Shari'ah differs essentially from the one advocated by political Islam. Both are 'invented traditions' that encourage the emergence of an international movement operating as a transnational religion with global networks. The overarching goal is to construct a divinely ordained order whose task it is to remake the world in a totalitarian, but sacred, spirit.

At this preliminary stage of analysis it is important to stress that it would be wrong to infer from references to the political character of jihadism that it has nothing to do with Islam. The central issue, however, is not whether there is a scriptural Islamic basis for militant Islamism. What is important is to recognise that jihadists perceive themselves as 'True Believers'.¹⁰ For this reason jihadist Islamists excommunicate all fellow Muslims from the Islamic community of the *umma* if their views are not shared. In jihadist Islamism the *umma* is reconfigured to become what Benedict Andersen calls an 'imagined community' fighting jihad for an Islamic world order. The argument that jihadism is much more than mere terrorism is also corroborated by the fact that, while they use violence without observing international conventions on ethical rules of conduct, they are also engaged in a war of ideas and worldviews. It follows that the role played by ideology in jihadism not only needs to be taken seriously for grasping its complex nature as a form of politicised religion, but also that scholarship needs to distinguish Islamism from spiritual Islam in this ongoing war of ideas.¹¹ This must be stressed if the present analysis is not to be open to the charge of Islamophobia.

II. The Roots of Totalitarian Islamism: the Movement of the Muslim Brotherhood

For ethical and analytical reasons the distinction we have drawn between Islam and Islamism (see note 3) is essential for the present inquiry. Because reformed Islam can be made compatible with democracy, it is imperative to emphasise that the claim that political Islam is a totalitarian ideology can only apply to it in its manifestations as a political religion, and does not refer to the relationship between Islamic spiritual beliefs and the ideology of jihadism. In fact the defence of open society against the totalitarian idea of jihadism is a task that in principle could be carried out jointly in a 'Muslim-western' alliance that ensures that the 'war on terror' is not a war on Islam and on its people, thus avoiding the charge of Islamophobia. However, in distinguishing between a liberal Islam and a totalitarian one, it is important to stress that the democratic Islam envisaged here has nothing to do with the 'Liberal Islam'¹² presented by Charles Kurzman in his recent reader on this topic. One of the alleged 'Muslim liberals' whom he cites is Mufti Yussuf al-Qaradawi, well-known for his incitements to jihad against the West, as well as other Islamists involved in turning Islam into a form of jihadism, thus replacing democratic Islam by a political religion with a totalitarian agenda.

Bearing in mind such distinctions, totalitarian Islamism can be seen as a mainstream opposition to western democratic institutions carried out by a minority,

which, despite its small membership, constitutes a highly efficient movement based on the complex social networks of a transnational religion. The expansion of the European Union and the impact of global migration have provided this movement with a safe haven for transnational terrorist networks in Europe. Further, the civil rights extended to the Islamists have allowed them to turn Europe into the battlefield of Islamism.¹³

The historical roots of contemporary Islamism, as well as of the violence that connects 'religion and terror' in political Islam, can be traced to the totalitarian 'Society of Muslim Brothers'¹⁴ established in 1928 in Cairo. Also called the 'Movement of the Muslim Brothers', this was the very first movement of Islamic fundamentalism. In the past decades this 'Brotherhood' has developed into an international movement claiming to represent the Islamic diaspora in Europe. The founder of this movement, Hasan al-Banna, published in c. 1930 his *Risalat al-Djihad* [Essay on Jihad].¹⁵ This text and other essays document the first formulation of the new totalitarian jihadist ideology. The view of the grandson of al-Banna, the Swiss born Tareq Ramadan, suggesting that there is a continuity within the Islamic revival stretching from al-Afghani in the nineteenth century to al-Banna in the twentieth century is utterly wrong.¹⁶ Unlike al-Banna, the revivalist al-Afghani has nothing to do with political Islam.

The fact that the major sources of Muslim indoctrination into intellectual terrorism can be traced back to the 'Movement of the Muslim Brotherhood' is corroborated in several catechisms and pamphlets authored by Sayyid Qutb. A pioneer of Islamism, Qutb continues to be its most influential ideologue across the globe.¹⁷ His work is also translated – by underground networks – into a number of Islamic languages. Certainly, the precursor of contemporary jihadism is al-Banna, the grandfather of Tareq Ramadan, but the idea of 'jihad as a permanent Islamic world revolution' (see note 7) in the pursuit of establishing global *Hakimiyyat Allah* stems from Qutb. This movement and its ideology pose a major threat to the secularity of western society established by the Westphalian system in the seventeenth century.¹⁸ The totalitarian form of jihadism represented by the 'Society of the Muslim Brotherhood' views as its primary task the destruction of this system. The agenda of this movement goes far beyond 'religious extremism'; it pursues the goal of imposing a totalitarian Islamic government throughout the world. Despite the current moderation in its rhetoric in its home-country, Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood continues to operate as a totalitarian movement, and it is not merely the advocate of an 'Islam without Fear', as some would like to believe.¹⁹ Thanks to its profound impact on the Muslims of the diaspora, the jihadist Islam of the Brotherhood has become Europe's dilemma.²⁰

Though the Muslim Brotherhood is in a minority, this new totalitarian movement has been very successful. With the assistance of Madrassas and faith schools, both in the world of Islam and in its diaspora in Europe, it has managed to spread its ideology and the worldview that underpins it. Its radical religious-Islamist ideology makes it possible for the movement to adopt indoctrination as a proactive policy of recruitment. The rationale is as follows: first teach jihadism and then conduct recruitment campaigns which aim to mobilise converts for the creation of a new totalitarian order. Following this strategy in the war of ideas, the Muslim Brotherhood has been able to win the hearts and souls of many young Muslims by indoctrinating them to accept the principles of a new totalitarianism.

As stated, the foremost authority of the totalitarian ideology of global jihad based on an Islamist interpretation of Islamic doctrines is Sayyid Qutb, a figure

who continues to be seen as the *rector spiritus* of Islamism. His call for a world revolution exerts considerable appeal, and predates by a few decades al-Qaeda and its own form of internationalism. However, it is the emergence of a post-Cold War, post-bipolar political situation that has enabled jihadist internationalism, which has existed ever since the birth of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, to thrive. The ultimate goal is the establishment of a global Islamicate, i.e. a *Dar al-Islam*, that will embrace the entire globe. It is this projected totalitarian order, the substance of the ideology of jihadism, that signals the return of the sacred in the guise of political religion, one whose implications for international security need to be evaluated.

Unlike earlier, secular forms of totalitarianism, the new variety is based on the return of the sacred in the form of a political religion within the framework of the culturation of political processes. Another factor is the ascendance in world politics of actors without allegiance to particular states who operate from within local movements acting globally, jihadist terrorism being a prime example. The phenomenon is of concern to international studies now that the transnational context of politicised religion has become one of the major issues of international affairs.²¹ In order to conceptualise this new phenomenon, I propose to adapt Hannah Arendt's theory of the totalitarianism by combining it with a view of jihadism as the fusion of a movement with the vision of a 'political order', in the tradition of Hedley Bull's work on International Relations. This tradition sees order as the pivotal subject of world politics.²² Such an order can either be democratic or totalitarian. The order which the Muslim Brotherhood envisions, the *Nizam Islami*, is essentially a totalitarian one. The source for the idea that civilisations rather than nations are the basic units of world politics is not Samuel Huntington, but rather Sayyid Qutb. In his book *al-Islam wa Mushkilat al-Hadorah* [Islam and the Problems of Civilisations], Qutb presents his vision of a world ruled by Islam and triumphing over its enemies, 'the Zionists and the Crusaders', its sovereignty legitimated by *Hakimiyyat Allah* and its society based on 'Shari'ah, the Islamic way of life and its worldview',²³ both of which are seen by Qutb as valid for the entire world. Two visions of the ideal world order conflict here: the Kantian schema for world peace based on the existing Westphalian order being challenged by the call for a *Pax Islamica* that can be traced back to the political Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood. Its politicisation of religion is accompanied by a religionisation of politics. This new totalitarian ideology can also be seen as a variety of religious fundamentalism, all species of which present their concept of order as a formula for remaking the world. Qutb's prescription of a *Hakimiyyat Allah* is the core element of the new ideology, and its movement fights for an ultimate divine political order to be installed as the new totalitarianism.

Two elements in Hannah Arendt's theory of totalitarianism in particular, the movement and the system of rule, are relevant when conceptualising the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism²⁴ which, in its Islamist permutation, combines 'Medieval theology and modern politics'²⁵ in a totalitarian manner. This gives the Islamic worldview a new shape through an invented tradition that 'religionises' politics. It is derived from the ideology and the worldview of the movement and society of the Muslim Brotherhood, which acts today as a form of transnational religion²⁶ encompassing the world of Islam including its diaspora in Europe. It is interesting to note that during the furore that followed Pope Benedict XVI's Regensburg Address on ecclesiastical history that took place in September

2006, this movement appeared in the theatre of events as a global player making concrete demands, as if it constituted a state.

III. The New Totalitarianism and the Scope of the Analysis

Having established the theme of the present study and outlined the origins of the new totalitarianism bent on establishing the order of *Hakimiyyat Allah*²⁷ in the name of Islam, it is necessary to address the thorny issue of Islamophobia. It is not only for the sake of scholarly analysis that it is important to break taboos, even though we are venturing into a conceptual minefield; it is necessary also to refute accusations of Orientalism and Islamophobia, charges often made for propagandistic purposes. In Europe following the attacks on 11 September, and more so after the assaults on Madrid, the Islamist execution of van Gogh in Amsterdam, and the Islamic uprising in the suburbs of Paris, it has become in a way easier to characterise jihadist Islamism as a threat to what Karl Popper called 'the open society', and to condemn totalitarianism from an Enlightenment humanist standpoint without being defamed. I do not overlook the concomitant need to avoid feeding prejudices against Islam. However, though I state this, I must add a warning. It is a fact that Islamists are constructing a putative Islamophobia by associating any suggestions that Islamism is a totalitarian ideology with an alleged demonisation of Islam. Therefore, the principles of an enlightened critique of Islamists needs to be established without losing sight of the way, as the ideology is currently positioned, Islamists can use such a critique as grist to their own mill.

The present analysis focuses on Europe and deals with jihadism in a European context. In so doing, one inevitably faces two extremes of reaction: on the one hand, the well-known and fashionable accusation made against any critique of Islam; and on the other the Islamist attacks on the West. Cultural relativist scholars do not share the view of political Islam presented in this article, and they fail to see that the new religious absolutism of Islam represents a new political religion that heralds a totalitarian threat to the open society. There is yet another extreme position which ascribes all evils to 'militant Islam' in such a way that Islam itself becomes equated with totalitarianism. The present analysis dissociates itself from each of these extremes. Rather, it aims only to cast light on a complex phenomenon, the ideology of jihadist Islamism, and to highlight the political agenda intrinsic to Islamic nostalgia for its cultural past.²⁸ In fact, the nostalgia of the Qutb tradition summons up collective memories so as to legitimate a claim for Islam's right to rule the world again. Islamists interpret this as fulfilling the religious duty to jihad of every true Muslim. This is the *return* of history, and not the end of it.

The reinterpretation of the classical Islamic jihad by Qutb is the core issue in totalitarian political Islam. He states: 'The overall and comprehensive revolution of Islam prescribes fighting jihad as a duty on all Muslims for establishing the centrality of Allah (*Rabbawiyya*) and his rule (*Hakimiyya*) on all earth ... Therefore, jihad is an idea of world revolution (*thawrah alamiyyah*) ... In Islam jihad is a permanent fight.'²⁹

Those who refuse to see the links between the political religion of Islamism and the related interpretation of Islam promulgated by al-Banna, Qutb and the 'Movement of the Muslim Brothers' have to distinguish between on the one hand the cynical, instrumental use of religion, and on the other a sincere and true belief in a

'divine agenda' based on orthodox religious doctrines presented as the religion of Islam. Understanding this distinction is crucial to grasping the current historical phenomenon of religiously legitimated totalitarianism embodied in Islamism. In the mind of its perpetrators, terrorism serves the cause of 'remaking the world' (see note 24), but is not in itself the goal of the movement. In fact, terrorism is directed against the existing order of the state as one of the infidels to be replaced by a world order based on divine tenets. The order of the state, as well as of the world, is the concern of the new totalitarianism, which takes the form of a 'revolt against the West'.³⁰

The connection between religion and civilisation was recognised clearly by Raymond Aron, who addressed this subject in terms of the 'heterogeneity of civilisations'. A civilisational dimension was also acknowledged by Qutb himself (see note 23). In addition, 2006 saw the celebrations of the 600th anniversary of the death of the great Muslim philosopher Ibn Khaldun in Granada, a figure who established the 'science of civilisations' [*ilm al-umram*]. Without referring to either Aron or to the founder of the science of civilisations, Ibn Khaldun, Samuel Huntington speaks of a 'clash between civilisations'. His thesis has to be placed in the conceptual framework suggested by Hedley Bull, who exposed the fallacy of the so-called global village when he stated that:

it is also clear that the shrinking of the globe, while it has brought societies to a degree of mutual awareness and interaction they have not had before, does not in itself create a unity of outlook and has not in fact done so ... Humanity is becoming simultaneously more unified and more fragmented.³¹

Without buying into any Huntingtonian 'clash' thesis, I propose to see the conflict between civilisations to which he refers as one that can be peacefully solved through cross-cultural 'bridging', though the religionisation of politics (e.g. the Islamisation of politics in Palestine) makes this far more difficult.³² The core phenomenon underlying the issue is a simultaneous process of structural globalisation and cultural fragmentation.³³ European political and economic expansion led to a process of structural remapping, one that has contributed to the structural mapping of the entire world according to the norms of the civilisation of the West.³⁴ However, this globalisation was not accompanied by the universalisation of western values. It is thus necessary to distinguish between the *globalisation* of structures and the *universalisation* of values. The globalisation of structures coexists with cultural fragmentation, and therefore with it comes the lack of universally valid and accepted norms and values.

The new challenges to the West stem from new challengers, non-state actors who in their revolt against western values call for a radical process of de-westernisation.³⁵ In so doing, they draw on religion, though in the guise of a political agenda, so as to legitimise the political order they envision with ideological foundations based on a set of religious tenets. Political issues are negotiable, but not religious ones. It is disturbing to see democracy identified exclusively with the West and Islam with *Hakimiyyat Allah* [God's rule], not only in the mind of Huntington, but in Islamism itself, because its ideology also depicts the competition between democracy and totalitarian rule as a clash of civilisations. Only an enlightened Islamic education in democracy could avert an ultimate conflict, but this is a most difficult undertaking in an age of Islamism.³⁶ Following Qutb, one

can see that on a higher level – i.e. in a conflict fought on the level of world politics as envisaged by Qutb (see note 18) – Islamism aspires towards a political order of *Hakimiyyat Allah* not only operating within the jurisdiction of an Islamic state, but ultimately within a new world order. This is not only a political alternative to democracy known as '*Nizam Islami* [Islamic order]', but also an alternative to the vision of a post-bipolar democratic peace that has emerged since the end of the Cold War.³⁷

Thus the Islamist drive to reverse trends towards secularising the world has introduced a new vision of totalitarianism into world politics. This issue assumes the character of a civilisational conflict in world politics³⁸ because processes of secularisation and those of de-secularisation are related to rival civilisational worldviews underpinning conflicting political visions for the world. These contrasting perspectives are embedded in a competition between a totalitarian order based on a globalised Shari'ah and a democracy that sees itself as the role model for the whole world. In line with Qutb and Mawdudi, the leading Islamist al-Qaradawi (see note 12 and in contrast note 39), a figure who is often presented to the western audience as an example of 'liberal Islam', dismisses democracy and discards it as an imported solution (*hal mustawrad*) alien to Islam.³⁹ This figure has become the global Imam of incitement to revolt against the West on al-Jazeera television.

It is intriguing to see the totalitarian Islamist movements active in the European diaspora. Fleeing the persecution in the world of Islam, Islamists find a refuge in the West and make full use of the very values that they dismiss. Jean-François Revel sees in this form of multiculturalism a 'Democracy against Itself'.⁴⁰ In defending the open society against its enemies, the reader is reminded of the two levels of order in the strategy of Islamism: first, the replacement of secular regimes in the world of Islam itself by the *Nizam* [system] of *Hakimiyyat Allah* [God's rule]; second, and building on this premise, the establishment of a global *Pax Islamica* via an Islamic '*thawra al-alamiyya*' (world revolution), as envisioned by Qutb. In Europe itself, while combating the new ideology of totalitarianism imported via migration and transnational movements, the choice is between the Europeanisation of Islam and the Islamisation of Europe (see note 26). In the foreign policy relations of Europe, both with the world of Islam and with the wider world, Europeans need not only to support pro-democracy movements, but also to understand the ambiguity of the Islamists. Despite their deep contempt for western democracy, Islamists make full use of western democratic rights for establishing the tactics to be adopted by their movements within the continent itself. Is it justified to provide the new totalitarianism with protection in the name of democracy in Europe? In its foreign policy, the European Union claims to support democratisation in neighbouring countries,⁴¹ yet continues to lack a consistent strategy for dealing with totalitarian Islamists within its own borders. Most European politicians fail to recognise the degree to which Islamism is prepared to use Europe as a theatre of war.

IV. The Context of Islamism's New Totalitarianism: a Transnational Movement based on a Reimagined Islamic *Umma*

Mark Juergensmeyer claims that a competition between religious and secular orders underlies 'The New Cold War' being fought by jihadists, and that this is a 'Terror in the Mind of God' (see note 15). Prior to the broadening of the scope of

jihadist activities from the domestic level of the state to an international level, the Islamic revolution in Iran, despite its sectarian Shi'i character, created a precedent for such a development. It also provided an incentive to Islamist terrorism. In fact, terrorism has served as an instrument of foreign policy for the exportation of Iran's Islamic revolution.⁴² This development in Iran led a few scholars to study Islam as the basis for a foreign policy that is legitimised by a politicised, transnational Islamist religion,⁴³ one bent on resolving the basic issue, namely: 'Who will provide the primary definition of the world order, the West or Islam?'⁴⁴ The resulting competition has given rise to what I have called elsewhere the 'new world disorder' (see note 8), a phrase that refers not only to the concrete threat, but also to its totalitarian character. This destabilisation in world politics, the 'religionisation of politics', has dedicated itself to combating 'secularism in International Relations'.⁴⁵

This analysis parts company from the one offered by Samuel P. Huntington, even if it had the merit of focusing attention on civilisation as a basic unit of political power.⁴⁶ In my contribution to the book by the former President of Germany, Roman Herzog, published under the title *Preventing the Clash of Civilisations* (see note 32), I expose empirical gaps not only in Huntington's knowledge of Islam, but also in his history of civilisation. This illustrates the need for western social scientists to have a greater knowledge of Islam and its emergence as a 'defensive culture'⁴⁷ in world affairs. In particular these scholars need to learn to distinguish between Islam as a faith, and its politicisation into Islamism (see notes 3 and 8). Another problem is posed by those politically correct scholars who not only demonise Huntington, but also silence free speech on the issue of civilisational conflict. Certainly Huntington has contaminated the term 'civilisation', but to claim that he was trying to 'substitute to the Soviet Union' with Islam is based on a critique of his work driven by conspiracy theory. The new transnational totalitarian ideology and movement are real enough. The political background to re-imagining the *umma* and the rise of Islamist internationalism in the world of Islam is the crisis of the nominally secular nation-states in the Middle East.⁴⁸ Islamist efforts at 'de-westernisation', not properly understood in the West, can be seen as aspiring towards a 'post-secular society',⁴⁹ something acknowledged by Juergen Habermas. However, Habermas fails to recognise that the competition between secular and divine orders is inherently connected to the problem of the presence of two worldviews that are diametrically opposed to one another. Consequently, the ideologies of neo-absolutism and of relativism clash with one another even though they arise from the same context.⁵⁰

The new totalitarianism is expressed in the concept of *din-wa-dawla* [unity of religion and state], an idea that challenges the validity of the secular democratic nation-state in the world of Islam, and in its place offers the alternative of *Hakimiyyat Allah* [God's rule]. It also goes beyond this concern with the Islamic world by claiming that it will found an Islamic form of global politics that embraces the whole of humanity. Again, in the intellectual tradition of the philosophical approach to International Relations presented in the work of Raymond Aron and Hedley Bull, Islamism is interpreted by this paper as an expression of an Islamic revival taking place on a political, cultural and religious level. At stake is not just a political but a *civilisational* challenge to the secular world order, one which legitimates itself as a way of combating an alleged 'Judeo-Christian conspiracy'⁵¹ believed to be directed against Islam itself. In other words, the Islamist 'revolt against the West' is also one against 'the rule of the world by Jews'.

This is a well-known theme in traditional European anti-Semitism. In fact, there is a latent contradiction in Islamism between the pursuit of de-westernisation and the adoption of the European tradition of anti-Semitism. This contradiction is resolved by inventing an alliance between 'Jews and Crusaders' which introduces into the revolt against the West a new combination of anti-Americanism and Judeophobia,⁵² an idea expressed in the ideology of contemporary Islamist anti-Semitism. In relating both essential segments of Islamism to one another, i.e. the idea of *Hakimiyyat Allah* [God's rule] to the idea of Jewish conspiracy against Islam, jihadism corresponds fully to Hannah Arendt's theory of totalitarianism. Therefore, it is wrong to use terms such as 'fanatism', 'terrorism' and 'extremism' for describing jihadist Islamism, because these terms fail to capture its full dimensions. Jihadist Islamism is the ideology of a transnational contemporary movement which has assumed the form of a new totalitarianism. Again, it must be stressed that to dismiss the study of the jihadist threat of Islamism to the world order as an expression of 'Islamophobia' would be intellectually dishonest. It is jihadism and not Islam itself that is at issue here. The indiscriminate reference to Edward Said's formula of 'covering Islam' for denouncing western media has served as a pretext for rejecting any critical approach out of hand.⁵³

Islamist totalitarianism promotes Islam in a self-congratulatory manner as a religion for peace, but this is model for peace that is dependent on the extension of *Hakimiyyat Allah* [God's rule] over the whole of humanity. The clear implication of this view is that there can be no world peace without the global domination of Islam. This is the articulation of a religion-based internationalism that aspires to the creation of a new international order based on totalitarian tenets of a total Shari'ahisation of Islam. It is this ideology of jihadist internationalism that has been adopted by al-Qaeda and ideologically cognate movements, and which must be criticised in the spirit of cultural diversity and religious pluralism.⁵⁴ The doctrine of Islamic dominance precludes the embrace of pluralism by Islamists. Not only does this emerge from their sentiment of superiority, but also from the closely connected religious doctrine of a civilisational 'revolt against the West'.⁵⁵ In the course of the post-bipolar crisis of international order, these internationalist ideas (e.g. Qutb) and related claims have been able to acquire the power of mobilising myths in the Islamic world. The end of the Cold War bipolar system has opened up Pandora's box for politicised religions.

To sum up, the most relevant features of Islam in the context of International Relations are the degree to which it represents a 'revolt against the West' made up of an alleged alliance between 'Jews and Crusaders', and its rejection of the secular order in Europe instituted by the Westphalian synthesis.⁵⁶ The rejection is legitimised by Islamism through the ideology of *Hakimiyyat Allah* [God's rule]. This concept of order is presented as a way of overcoming the perceived state of crisis in the secular nation-state, and is valid for the whole of humanity. It must be stressed that 'the *Nizam Islami* [Islamic system]'⁵⁷ is a totalitarian political project of Islamism not even acceptable to all Muslims, especially to those committed to freedom and democracy. Only a few jihadists yearn for the traditional order of the caliphate of *sunna*, which is not acceptable to the *shi'a*. Most exponents of political Islam restrict themselves, however, to the notion of *Nizam Islami*. This system is not a vision of peace, and clearly poses a threat to non-Muslims, who, according to the Shari'ah, would be discriminated against as *dhimmi*, i.e. tolerated minorities.⁵⁸ This is a violation of the human rights of non-Muslims, and not, as Islamists claim, a variety of tolerance; in a totalitarian, Shari'ahised Islamic state,

and especially in an Islamist world order, non-Muslims would suffer. Even though this vision is not a realistic possibility, the jihadist call for an Islamic world order has serious practical consequences because it acts as a mobilising ideology with considerable appeal to socially disadvantaged Muslims. This undermines the peaceful coexistence of Muslims and non-Muslims. Therefore, the new totalitarianism poses specific threats to security.

V. The Irregular War and Security: the New Totalitarianism in Practice

The new totalitarianism of Islamism is not only a challenge to the policing of security threats, but also to traditional approaches to security studies as they can no longer provide adequate perspectives for studying the changed post-bipolar world of the twenty-first century. There have been a few promising attempts to revise current approaches, such as the theory proposed by Barry Buzan,⁵⁹ which broadened the perspective on this issue by looking at security in a context that extends beyond conventional military wisdom. However, we were still at the beginning of the process of rethinking strategies when the events of 11 September 2001 reminded us in no uncertain terms that security studies would have to deal with the terrorism committed by politicised religion from a new angle, one that considers not just the organised military force deployed by states, but also the role played by culture and religion, factors not even acknowledged in Buzan's innovative study. In its immediate aftermath, many Europeans comforted themselves with the thought that 9/11 was a settling of old scores with the USA and that it did not concern them, but subsequent events between 2004 and 2006 – especially the acts of violence in Madrid, Amsterdam, London and Paris, alongside bitter Muslim reaction to the Danish cartoon and the speech made by the Pope – demonstrate that Europeans are not just part of the game but major players..

This article has set out to criticise the prevalent preoccupation of the West with Islamist terrorism. By studying the totalitarian dynamics of jihadism, it is possible to see this ideology instead as a declaration of war on the existing world order by warriors who consider themselves to be non-state actors. The threat to international security is thus inseparably linked to a concept of order based on a world religion. The jihadists believe it is possible to mobilise their fellow religionists, numbering one-fifth of the world population (1.6 billion of about 6 billion people of world population), whom they re-imagine as an *umma*, the historical subject of their world revolution. In the name of this transnational community constituted by the *umma*, al-Qaeda⁶⁰ has declared jihad as war, not only on the West, but also on those Muslims who do not join in with the goal of establishing a totalitarian order. Can it succeed?

The means it has adopted for its struggle – as argued in earlier parts of this article – is an irregular war which takes the form of sporadic acts of terrorism. This is no longer the classical jihad of Islam (see note 37). In the process of the politicisation of Islam, a totalitarian ideology has emerged that disregards the cultural and religious diversity in the world, as well as the heterogeneity of Islamic civilisation itself. The differences between Sunnite and Shi'ite Muslims have led to an interne-cine Islamic war, as the case of Iraq reveals all too clearly, while Islamism also threatens Muslims who form part of the diaspora of Islam in Europe. Given their cultural diversity, Muslims need to embrace pluralism both within Islam and in the world at large. In attempting to impose the original Arab Sunni pattern of

Islam on all humanity, Islamists ignore religious and cultural diversity both throughout the world of Islam and in the wider world. Jihadists insist on essentialising Islam by reducing it to the single monolithic entity, an idea epitomised by the rhetoric of a clash between civilisations. However, Islam cannot behave like a monolith; even Sunni jihadist political Islamist movements are diverse. However, within Islamist internationalism diverse Islamist groups adhere to similar concepts of political order based on a common politicisation of their religion, and on their common understanding of Shari'ah [divine law]. It is not Islam, but the Islamist totalitarian movement which has grown up within a plural Islam that poses the challenge to world security by fighting an irregular war against the West.

This challenge was not sufficiently understood during the Iraq War of 2003, which was justified by the 'security threat' posed by the regime of Saddam Hussein as leader of the 'Republic of Fear'.⁶¹ However, the jihadist war is being carried out by non-state actors, not by Iraq as a state. Therefore, the removal from power of Hussein in Iraq had no effect on these groups at all. Far from weakening them, the war and its aftermath have provided an enormous boost to jihadism and the appeal of its ideology. This is an empirical fact that continues to be true even after the killing of Zarqawi (see note 2).

The challenge of jihadist Islamism to security is its 'revolt against the West', and this civilisational perspective must be made central to any assessment of the risks it poses. In Iraq, for instance, the USA views the removal of Hussein as a liberation while Iraqis themselves condemn US presence as a military occupation of crusaders. At this point war can no longer be understood here simply as a military conflict between states, but a conflict of world-views. In my earlier book, *The War of Civilisations* (1995), and in the project run by the German Council for Foreign Affairs referred to earlier, I considered the role played by particular sets of norms and values in the analysis of security, and coined the term 'civilisational conflict' (see note 38). According to this approach,⁶² conflict revolves around the normatively different understanding of five points of particular issue: (1) the state, (2) law, (3) religion, (4) war/peace and (5) knowledge. Alternative ideas of civilisation differ over these areas of issue, and if these differences become politicised then disparities in the ways these five fields are conceptualised can give rise to conflict. The 'war of civilisations' started out as a war of ideas (see note 11) revolving around values and world views which affected the resulting conflict on all three levels: domestic, regional and international. On 11 September this kind of war assumed an overtly military shape. It follows that Jihadism contributes to the militarisation of conflicts between civilisations, and in this capacity it creates a security concern. Though the West is militarily strong, the irregular war of terrorism, the weapon of the weak, cannot be defeated by conventional military force. Israel has won all inter-state wars, but not the irregular war of the Islamist Intifada ongoing in Palestine since September 2000.

These reflections underline the need for a new security approach to deal with the growing threats on two levels: first, conflicts of values which have political implications, but cannot be settled by military means; and second, the irregular use of force which jihadists believe is being deployed in the 'mind of God'. The event of 11 September, as well as the ensuing jihadist attacks in Europe and worldwide, have revealed how interrelated these two levels are. The jihad-terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda against New York and Washington in 2001 succeeded in militarising a conflict of values between Islamic and western civilisation over the

ideal 'order'. Their actions were not those of what Edward Said called a 'crazed gang'. Instead they were acts of irregular war carried out by jihadists that turned a conflict between civilisational world views into a military conflict (see note 29), a war whose goal is to realise state the totalitarian order of *Hakimmiyyat Allah*. 'Gangs' do not involve themselves in international affairs. The western world order is based on 'notions of territorial boundaries, market economies, private religiosity, and the priority of individual rights', while the Islamist one is promoted on the grounds of *Hakimmiyyat Allah*, and hence on the 'universal mission of a trans-tribal community called to build a social order founded on pure monotheism natural to humanity'.⁶³

This analysis leads to three central observations. *First, the problem of political order* – jihadist Islamism is a powerful variety of the politicisation of religion. It not only expresses cultural differences in order to raise them to the level of military conflict, but also revives traditional worldviews in a way that widens the sense of a gap between civilisations. Religious fundamentalism is a global phenomenon which can be found in almost all world religions, all of which share a family resemblance. Islamism is a very specific variant of fundamentalism when it comes to the issue of international order because it seeks to impose a global totalitarian order through military means, and these ideals cannot be controlled by conventional approaches to security.

Second, holy terror and irregular war – not all Islamists fight for their goals in institutions via political strategies, as the AKP of Turkey does. Among them we also find those who resort to violence, within the framework of terrorism, as a way to enforce their concept of order. Jihadism combines 'holy terror' with irregular war. *Third, 'Islamic fundamentalism'* – in this article, the terms 'political Islam', 'Islamism' and 'Islamic fundamentalism' have been used interchangeably. This is unusual, because some dispute the application of the concept fundamentalism to Islam because of its value-laden connotations. However, this is misleading. Though open to abuse, 'fundamentalism' is still a scholarly analytical concept for studying the politicisation of religion. By using the term Islamism as an alternative to fundamentalism, scholars are unwittingly contributing to the stereotyping of Islam by implicitly seeing it as the only example of the politicisation of religion. In contrast, I argue that 'Islamism' is one variant of religious fundamentalism, a phenomenon that does not only occur in Islam. It is jihadism, the military dimension of this phenomenon, that is specifically Islamic and requires the threat it poses to the West to be assessed within the concept of 'new frontiers of security',⁶⁴ which departs from traditional concept of security dominated by military thinking.

To sum up, Islamist jihadism is not only an ideology of religious extremism, but also a new concept of warfare and of political order. In its aspiration for a new world order – a claim revived after the end of the Cold War – Islamism embodies the foremost totalitarian movement of the twenty-first century – a movement based on politicised religion. This movement, a combination of Islamist ideology with jihadism, is the only one in the world that does not restrict its goal of establishing a divine order to a territorialised civilisation – as is the case of Hindu fundamentalism, for instance. Jihadist Islamism seeks to globalise Islam.

The related challenges to international security cannot be grasped within the framework of the old state-centred approach. In previous conflicts with enemy states, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces have been able to overpower foes, as they did the Serbian army in 1999, with regular armed forces. The same point applies to the effort to oust Saddam in the Iraq war between March

and April 2003. In contrast, neither the acts of revenge committed by the religious-ethnic UÇK irregulars against the Christian Serbs and Macedonians, nor the irregular war against coalition troops in Iraq and in Afghanistan, could be checked by conventional forces. The victories over the Taliban and over Saddam cannot be repeated against the jihadists. Non-state totalitarianism cannot be countered by state armies, since it is a global movement.

VI. Conclusions

The Islamist pursuit of an Islamic world order is much more than either terrorism or religious extremism. It is a movement represented by a variety of political organisations that use the same patterns of mobilisation within the framework of the totalitarian order of *Hakimiyyat Allah*, an idea that plans to convert the entire globe into the *Dar al-Islam* (house of Islam). Despite originating in the world of Islam, the movement of jihadist internationalism has been able to establish itself within the Islamic diaspora community in Europe itself, making the European Union a key battlefield. In making such assertions it is essential to distinguish Islam and Islamism, not only to protect ordinary Muslims from persecution, but also to counter jihadists who want to recruit from within the Muslim diaspora. In Europe, Europeans need to learn how to live with Islam and engage in its Europeanisation (see note 26) in terms of a politics of inclusion and integration. This concept is relevant both for Muslim immigrants and for Turkey in its bid to join the EU.⁶⁵ It is also relevant to EU and national policies to promote the inclusion of Muslim immigrant communities, policies vital to issues of integration and security (the German record on this issue is a very poor one).⁶⁶ The social exclusion of young Muslim immigrants makes them susceptible to the totalitarian ideology of Islamism. This makes them easy prey to jihad-Islamists. The multiculturalism of post-modern cultural relativism also opens the gate for Islamists to Europe. It is this combination of a lack of integration and the 'anything goes' ideology of multiculturalism which smoothes the way for Islamic fundamentalists to establish safe havens for their networking.

In Europe and throughout the world, democratic civil society is the alternative to all totalitarianisms. To limit Islamist activities in Europe, the alternative to multiculturalism that needs to be pursued is cultural pluralism, because it combines the acceptance of diversity with the binding communal commitment to the core values of democracy and civil society. The Europeanisation of Islam so that it becomes a Euro-Islam⁶⁷ is one of the most promising strategies for averting the continued 'religionisation' of its politics into a source of tensions and conflict (see note 45). Another tactic in the efforts to counter jihad terrorism is to engage in a war of ideas instead of 'tolerating the intolerable', even if such a strategy 'verges on the politically incorrect'.⁶⁸ It belongs to the legacy of Karl Popper not only to defend the open society, but also to refuse to tolerate in the name of tolerance the intolerable,⁶⁹ i.e. any form of totalitarianism.

The instruments needed to combat Islamist totalitarianism both in the world of Islam and in Europe are multifaceted. In this contribution I have been at pains to analyse and shed light on the challenge posed by jihadist Islamist totalitarian ideology to the open society of the West. However, it should not be forgotten that political Islam is primarily a challenge to Muslims, forcing them to confront the perceived threat to their religious faith and community, and also to come to terms with the reality of cultural modernity.⁷⁰

The final conclusion is that there are two issues posed by Islamism: first, the new totalitarianism at large in the world of Islam; and second, its impact on Europe due to the effects of global migration. The solution for Europe lies in Europeanising Islam in order to counter efforts to Islamise Europe. Since Islam is now an integral part of Europe, the call for a Euro-Islam⁷¹ presents a democratic solution to the problem of Islamism. In the world of Islam itself the options are either to succumb to the new totalitarianism or alternatively to prepare the way for the reforms needed for Islam to embrace of secular democracy⁷² within the framework of an open liberal Islam – though not the one proposed by Kurzman (note 12). This would open the way for Muslims to join the rest of the world within the framework of democratic peace (see note 37). The introduction of real democracy to the world of Islam would help Muslims to come to terms with the rest of the world and to be inoculated against the illusions of a global Islamisation.

In the ongoing war of ideas, Islamists argue that ‘Islam is a religion of peace’. However, their jihadist internationalism is not a contribution to world peace, but a new variety of terrorist totalitarian movement, one that alienates Muslims from the rest of humanity. While Muslims are being challenged to dissociate themselves from totalitarian global jihad, a European-led democratisation of the European Union’s sphere of influence is the best policy for countering Islamist totalitarian ideology, and to break the deadlock of the ‘unsuccessful integration’ of Muslims in Europe.⁷³ In short, Islamist jihadism – both as an ideology and as a movement – poses a civilisational challenge to Europe’s secular democracy and to Muslims themselves.

Notes

1. In an early contribution of 1982 to this subject by Grant Wordlaw, *Political Terrorism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982, 2nd edn 1989) one finds, for instance, no reference at all either to Islam or to jihad. In contrast, recent books like Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) are replete with such references. Among the recent contributions are David J. Whittaker (ed.), *The Terrorism Reader* (London: Routledge, 2001), and Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2001).
2. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, ‘Zarqawi’s Life after Death’, *International Herald Tribune*, 10–11 June (2006), p.4. See also the special issues on this subject, ‘After Zarqawi’ of *Newsweek*, 19 June 2006 and *Time*, the same date.
3. On the basic difference between the religion of Islam as a faith and its politicisation as an ideology, see Bassam Tibi, ‘Islam and Islamism: a Dialogue with Islam and a Security Approach vis-à-vis Islamism’, in Jacoby Tamy and Sasley Brent (eds), *Redefining Security in the Middle East* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), pp.62–82.
4. On this concept of political religion as a religious faith embedded in politics see the report on this project completed at The Hannah Arendt Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism/HAIT, and published as Gerhard Besier (ed.), *Politische Religion und Religionspolitik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005); my contribution is on pp.229–260. The report publishes a case study of the Islam advocated by the institutional Turkish AKP (Party of Justice and Development), which portrays it as a covert totalitarian ideology. The findings of the Swiss project of the University of Basel were published as George Pfeleiderer and Ekkehard Stegemann (eds), *Politische Religion* (Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 2004). My chapter on political Islam is on pp.223–254.
5. The classic text by Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, was first published in New York 1955 and reprinted in many editions. On the application of this approach to political Islam see Bassam Tibi, *Der neue Totalitarismus. Heiliger Krieg und westliche Sicherheit* (Darmstadt: Primus, 2004). Chapter 2 is devoted to Islamism, and Chapter 3 to jihadism viewed as the new totalitarianism.
6. See the chapter on anti-Semitism in Part One of Hannah Arendt’s book. See too Bassam Tibi, ‘Die Mär des Islamismus. Von der jüdischen und kreuzzüglerischen Verschwörung gegen den Islam’,

- in Klaus Faber und Julius Schoeps (eds), *Neu-alter Judenhass. Antisemitismus* (Berlin: Verlag Brandenburg, 2006), pp.107–202.
7. The idea of jihad in the new interpretation of a ‘permanent Islamic World Revolution’ was first articulated by Sayyid Qutb in *al-Salam al-Alami wa al-Islam [World Peace and Islam]* (Cairo: al-Shuruq, new legal edition 1992), p.172. See also the references to Qutb in notes 23 and 27. On the Islamist concept of *umma* internationalism see Peter Mandeville, *Transnational Muslim Politics. Reimagining the Umma* (London: Routledge, 2001), in particular Chapter 6, pp.178–91. On the implementation of this internationalism by al-Qaeda see Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden* (New York: Free Press, 2001), Chapter 10.
 8. For a content-based survey see Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism. Political Islam and the New World Disorder* (Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 1998, updated edition 2002).
 9. The three scholars who conceptualise this change in warfare are Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991); Kalevi Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Bassam Tibi, *Conflict and War in the Middle East. From Interstate War to New Security*, 2nd enlarged edn (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1997), Chapter 12. See also Tamy and Brent, *Redefining Security in the Middle East*.
 10. Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer. Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Perennial Library, 2002), reprint of the original 1951 edition.
 11. Bassam Tibi, “Countering Terrorism als Krieg der Weltanschauungen”, in Martin von Creveld and Katharina van Knop (eds), *Countering Modern Terrorism. History, Current Issues and Future Threats* (Bielefeld: Bertelsmann, 2005), pp.131–72. See also notes 24 and 25.
 12. Charles Kurzman (ed.), *Liberal Islam. A Sourcebook* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). The selection of texts in this reader significantly distorts the picture of Islam.
 13. Francis Fukuyama, “Identity, Immigration and Liberal Democracy”, *Journal of Democracy* 17/2 (April 2000), pp.5–20. This addresses political Islam as a challenge to Europe; for more details see Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam, Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London: Routledge, 1991), and Graham Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003). See also Tibi, note 8.
 14. Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).
 15. See Hasan al-Banna, “*Risalat al-jihad/essay on jihad*” in the collected writings of al-Banna, *Majmu’at Rasail al-Banna* (Cairo: Dar al-Da’wa, 1990), pp.271–92. Without referring to al-Banna the following important books discuss the issue of religion and violence: Bruce Lincoln, *Holy Terrors. Thinking about Religion after September 11* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2003); Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God* (Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 2000); and Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Just War against Terror* (New York: Basic Books, 2003).
 16. Tareq Ramadan, *Aux Sources du Renouveau Musulman. De al-Afghani à Hasan al-Banna* (Paris: Editions Bayard, 1998). The suggested continuity ‘de ... à’, i.e. from/to is based on a distorted presentation of history, because al-Afghani and al-Banna represent radically different directions in Islam. See the revealing book by Caroline Fourest, *Frère Tariq* (Paris: Grasset, 2004).
 17. On the thought and impact of Sayyid Qutb see Roxanne E. Euben, *The Enemy in the Mirror. Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Nationalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), Chapter 3. On his writings see note 7.
 18. In a most interesting article by Daniel Philpott, “The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations”, *World Politics* 55/1 (2002), pp.66–95, and earlier in Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?, Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), the return of religion as a political ideology is discussed in the context of post-bipolar de-secularisation. On this subject see also Bassam Tibi, “Secularisation and Desecularisation in Modern Islam”, *Religion, Staat, Gesellschaft*, 1/1 (2000), pp.95–117.
 19. Raymond W. Baker, *Islam without Fear. Egypt and the New Islamists* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).
 20. Peter R. Neumann, “Europe’s Jihadist Dilemma”, *Survival*, 48/2 (2006), pp.71–84.
 21. On this politicisation see the contributions to the special issue of *Millennium, Journal of International Affairs* (29/3) 2000 on Religion and International Relations. This issue includes Bassam Tibi, “Post-Bipolar Order in Crisis: The Challenge of Politicised Islam”, pp.843–59. This meaning of the ‘return of the sacred’ is not well understood by Jürgen Habermas (see note 49): see Bassam Tibi, “Habermas and the Return of the Sacred. Is it a Religious Renaissance? Political Religion as a New Totalitarianism”, *Religion, Staat, Gesellschaft*, 3/2 (2002), pp.265–96.
 22. In his seminal work, Hedley Bull strongly places the study of order at the center of International Relations. See his classic, *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), particularly Part 1. For an appreciation of Bull, see the chapter

- "Bull and the Contribution to International Relations", in Stanley Hoffmann, *World Disorders. Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp.13–34.
23. Sayyid Qutb, *al-Islam wa Mushkilat al-Hadarah* [Islam and the Problems of Civilisation] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 9th legal printing 1988). On Islam's enemies see pp.186, 191. On the Islamist worldview see note 24.
 24. The most authoritative work on this subject-matter, produced for a project run at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, is Martin Marty and Scott Appleby (eds), *The Fundamentalism Project*, 5 vols (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1991–5). See in volume 2 the chapter by Bassam Tibi, "The Worldview of Sunni-Arab Fundamentalists: Attitudes towards Modern Science and Technology", pp.73–102. Volume 3 of this project, *Fundamentalisms and the State* includes the article by the Egyptian historian Abdel Asziz Ramadan "The Strategies of The Muslim Brotherhood" (Chapter 8, pp.152–83). To understand this issue the respective chapters in the section "Remaking the World through Militancy" of the same volume 3 (pp.429–643) are particularly relevant.
 25. Emanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam. Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985).
 26. Peter Katzenstein und Timothy Byrnes introduced the concept of "transnational religion" into the discipline of International Relations in a project in which I participated run at Cornell 2003–06, and published with both acting as editors in *Religion in an Expanding Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). See particularly the chapter on transnational religion by Timothy Byrnes, pp.283–305 and my chapter on "The Europeanisation of Islam or the Islamisation of Europe", pp.204–224.
 27. On this concept of divine order as integral to the religionisation of politics see the analysis based on authentic Islamist sources by Bassam Tibi, *Fundamentalismus im Islam. Eine Gefahr für den Weltfrieden* (Darmstadt: Primus Verlag, 2000, 3rd edn 2002), Chapters 2, 4 and 5. The origin of this concept is included in the – in a way – holy book of the Islamists by Sayyid Qutb, *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* [Signposts along the Road], published in millions of copies in Arabic as well as in diverse translations into other Islamic languages. I use the 13th legal edition (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1989).
 28. On the true meaning of Islamic nostalgia see John Kelsay, *Islam and War* (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1993), pp.25–6. Kelsay's presentation makes it clear that there is no 'end of history' as Francis Fukuyama claimed in his famous article, but rather a return of it in a new shape accompanied by new claims. This is the substance of Islamist nostalgia, which is not a mere romanticism, but the vision of a future totalitarian order.
 29. Sayyid, *al-Salam al-Alami wa al-Islam*, pp. 172–3. See also the article "jihad" by Bassam Tibi in Roger Powers and William B. Voegelé (eds), *Protest, Power and Change, An Encyclopedia of Nonviolent Action* (New York: Garland Publishers 1997), pp. 277–81.
 30. Hedley Bull, "The Revolt against the West", in Hedley Bull and A. Watson (eds), *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), pp. 217–18. One of the professed followers of the Muslim Brothers, Muhammed Ammarah in his book *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya wa al-Tahaddi al-Hadari* [The Islamic Awakening and the Civilisation Challenge] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, no date) gives this 'revolt against the West' a meaning: it is not only against the hegemony of the West, it is against its civilisation as such. See pp.30–40 and also the section on the Muslim Brothers, pp.41–83.
 31. Bull (note 22), p. 273.
 32. On 'bridging' see Bassam Tibi, "International Morality and Cross-cultural Bridging", in Roman Herzog et al. (eds), *Preventing the Clash of Civilisations* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 107–26. In contrast to bridging, which is the conflict-fuelling strategy of Islamisation, see the case study by Beverly Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Politics in Palestine* (London: Tauris, 1996).
 33. On this simultaneity see Tibi (note 8 above), Chapters 1 and 5.
 34. Philip Curtin, *The World and the West. The European Challenge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). See also Roger Scruton, *The West and the Rest. Globalisation and the Terrorist Threat* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2002). On the claims and on the failure, as well as the future, of the universalism of western civilisation see David Gress, *From Plato to NATO. The Idea of the West and its Opponents* (New York: The Free Press, 1998), Chapter 12. On the concept of de-westernisation see the reference in the next note.
 35. See Bassam Tibi, "Culture and Knowledge. The Fundamentalist Claim of de-Westernisation", in *Theory, Culture and Society* 12/1 (1995), pp.1–24.
 36. See Bassam Tibi, "Education and Democratisation in an Age of Islamism", in Alan Olson (ed.), *Educating in Democracy* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), particularly pp.203–19.
 37. See Bassam Tibi, "From Islamist Jihadism to Democratic Peace? Islam at the Crossroads in Post-Bipolar International Politics", *Ankara Paper 16* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2005). On the alternative

- to totalitarian jihadism, i.e. democratic peace, see Bruce Russett, *Grasping Democratic Peace* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). In a sense different from that proposed by Qutb and Islamism (see note 7), I acknowledge a civilisational difference in understanding peace. On this issue see Bassam Tibi, "War and Peace in Islam", in Terry Nardin (ed.), *The Ethics of War and Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996 and 1998), reprinted in Sohail Hashmi (ed.) *Islamic Political Ethics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
38. I presented the new concept of world-view-based civilisational conflict in world politics in an article that was the fruit of a project run by the German Council for Foreign Affairs on post-bipolar German policy. See Karl Kaiser (ed.), *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik* (Munich: Oldenburg Verlag, 1995), vol. 2, pp.61–80.
 39. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *al-Hall al-Islami wa al-hulul al-mustawradah* [The Islamic Solution and the Imported Solutions] (Beirut: al-Risalah, 1980), volume 1 of 3.
 40. See the chapter on Islamic fundamentalism in Jean-Francois Revel, *Democracy against Itself* (New York: Free Press, 1993), Chapter 12; see also Michael Teitelbaum and Jay Winter, *A Question of Numbers. High Migration, Low Fertility and the Politics of National Identity* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), pp.221–39. For the Fukuyama article see note 13.
 41. See Michael Emerson (ed.), *Democratisation in the European Neighborhood* (Brussels: CEPS, 2005), which includes my chapter on Islam and Democracy (pp.93–116).
 42. Edgar O'Balance, *Fundamentalist Terrorism 1979–95. The Iranian Connection* (New York: New York University Press, 1997). See also Bassam Tibi, "Extremismus und Terrorismus als Mittel des Revolutionsexports", *Jahrbuch Extremismus und Demokratie* 11 (1999), pp.79–96.
 43. Adeed Dawisha (ed.), *Islam in Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), in particular Chapter 1. See also, more recently, Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser, *A Sense of Siege. The Geopolitics of Islam and the West* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).
 44. Kelsay (note 28), p.117. Hoffmann, *World Disorders* also employs the term 'disorder', however, without any reference to religion or fundamentalism, thus overlooking the role played by politicised religion as a major source of disorder and of the threat to international security. In contrast, my book on this issue published in the same year, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism* (note 8) emphasises this factor.
 45. See Philpott, "The Challenge of September 11". On the religionisation of politics see Bassam Tibi, "Islam Between Religious-cultural Practice and Identity Politics", in Helmut Anheier and Y. Raj Isar (eds), *Cultures, Conflict, Globalisation* (London: Sage, 2007). See also the classic by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, reprint 1996), introduction, pp.1–14, which is helpful for understanding the processes at work in religionised politics.
 46. Samuel Huntington, *Clash of Civilisations and the Framing of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster 1996). The idea of a 'clash' was first proposed in an article published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993. The statement in the text is acknowledged in my book *Krieg der Zivilisationen. Politik und Religion zwischen Vernunft und Fundamentalismus*, first published in 1995. Unfortunately, Huntington simply ignores this publication in his own book. In a personal letter to me he praised it, however. In the new edition of *Krieg der Zivilisationen*, published in 1998 (Munich: Heyne Verlag) I added Chapter 7, pp.305–33, in which I dissociate myself from any Huntingtonisation of the civilisational conflict. See also notes 32 and 38 above.
 47. On this issue see Bassam Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam* (Salt Lake City, UT: Utah University Press, 1988), introduction; Bassam Tibi, *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, reprinted 1991).
 48. See Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds), *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), which includes my chapter on the crisis of the nation-state, pp.127–52.
 49. Juergen Habermas, *Glauben und Wissen* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2001). For a critique see Bassam (note 21).
 50. See the proceedings of the Erasmus Foundation, Amsterdam, *The Limits of Pluralism. Neo-Absolutisms and Relativism* (Amsterdam: Praemium Erasmianum, 1994). In this Amsterdam debate political Islam is presented as a variety of neo-absolutism by Bassam Tibi in a paper published on pp.29–36. This volume also includes the heated controversy between Clifford Geertz and the late Ernest Gellner on culture and relativism.
 51. See the anti-Semitic allegation of "Une vaste conspiration judeo-chrétienne", by Mohammed Y. Kassab, *L'Islam face au nouvel ordre mondial* (Algier: Editions Salama, 1991), pp. 75–93. Not only Islamists, but some Germans (Left and Right) claim with an anti-Semitic insinuation that 11 September was a home-made conspiracy. This is done in a number of anti-American bestsellers

- published in Germany. See the special issue *Verschwörung* [conspiracy] of the news magazine *Der Spiegel* 37 (2003) criticising these bestsellers. On this anti-Semitism see note 6 above.
52. This issue is discussed by Matthias Küntzel, *Djihad und Judenhass* (Freiburg: Ça Ira Verlag, 2002), see also Bassam Tibi, *Der neue Totalitarismus* (note 5).
 53. Edward Said, *Covering Islam* (New York: Pantheon, 1981). There are numerous reprints.
 54. Bassam Tibi, "The Pertinence of Islam's Predicament with Pluralism for the Democratisation in Asia", *Religion-Staat-Gesellschaft*, 7/1 (2006), pp.83–117.
 55. Bull (note 30), p. 223.
 56. See Philpott (note 18).
 57. See Salim Al-Awwa, *fi al-Nizam al-Siyasi li al-dawla al-Islamiyya* (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Masr, 1975, 6th reprinting 1983).
 58. On the discrimination of non-Muslims in the Shari'ah see the work of the Muslim reformist Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, *Toward an Islamic Reformation* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), Chapter 7. Islamic Shari'ah contradicts individual human rights. See Bassam Tibi, "Islamic Law/Shari'a, Human Rights, Universal Morality and International Relations", *Human Rights Quarterly*, 16/2 (1994), pp.277–99.
 59. See Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd edn (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991).
 60. See Bergen (note 7), *Holy War Inc.*, and Jonathan Schanzer, *al-Qaida's Armies* (New York: The Washington Institute for Near Eastern Studies, 2005).
 61. Samir al-Khalil (alias Kenan Makiya), *Republic of Fear* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989).
 62. Tibi (note 46).
 63. Kelsay (note 28), p.117.
 64. Leonore Martin (ed.), *New Frontiers in Middle Eastern Security* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1999), introduction.
 65. See Bassam Tibi, "The Quest of Islamic Migrants and of Turkey to Become European", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 3/1 (Spring 2004), pp.13–28. On the origin of the concept of Euro-Islam see note 67 below, and also Nezar al-Sayyad and Manuel Castells (eds), *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam?* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), which includes Bassam Tibi, "Muslim Migrants in Europe: Between Euro-Islam and Ghettoisation", pp.31–52. See also my chapter in Katzenstein and Byrnes (note 26).
 66. See my critique "Germany as a Land of Ideas: A Model for Foreigners and Immigrants?", in Theo Sommer (ed.), *My Idea of the Land of Ideas* (Hamburg: Zeit-Verlag, 2006), pp. 207–9, and my essay "Fremd in Deutschland", *Capital*, 19 (31 August 2006), pp.35–6.
 67. Bassam Tibi, "Les conditions d'Euro-Islams", in Robert Bistolfi and Francois Zabbal (eds), *Islam d'Europe. Intégration ou insertion communautaire* (Paris: Editions de l'Aube, 1995), pp.230–34.
 68. See also my unheeded warning cited in the report "Tolerating the Intolerable", *Newsweek* (5 November 2001), p.46.
 69. Karl Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, 2 vols (London: Routledge and Paul Kegan, 1945).
 70. This is the major theme of Bassam Tibi, *Islam between Culture and Politics* (London: Palgrave, 2001), pp.53–68.
 71. On this issue one reads in *Time Magazine*, 24 December 2001, p. 49: "Bassam Tibi ... who coined the term Euro-Islam, insists on the integration of Europe's Muslims". Cf. Bassam Tibi, "Between Communitarism and Euro-Islam. Europe, Multicultural Identities and the Challenge of Migration", in John Docker and Gerhard Fischer (eds), *Adventures of Identity. European Multicultural Experiences and Perspectives* (Tübingen: Stauffenberg, 2001), pp.45–60.
 72. On Islam's compatibility with democracy and modernity see William M. Watt, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity* (London: Routledge, 1988), and Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity. Transformation of Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1982). Bassam Tibi, "Democracy and Democratisation in Islam. The Quest of Islamic Enlightenment", in Michèle Schmiegelow (ed.), *Democracy in Asia* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997), pp.127–46. On Islam and democratic peace see note 37 above, and on the obstacles to democratisation in an age of Islamism, note 36.
 73. Bassam Tibi, *Islamische Zuwanderung. Die gescheiterte Integration* (Munich: DVA, 2002).